their fins), which would provide an indication of whether they were intended for high altitude interceptions, or were aimed at an aircraft flying at medium altitudes. Intelligence analysts wanted the capability to see the missiles and their control surfaces (i.e. (See: Chris Manteuffel, “An enigma behind the iron curtain: the Tallinn anti-ballistic missile system and satellite intelligence,” The Space Review, March 18, 2019) Although Soviet ABM radars were massive and easy to spot in reconnaissance satellite photos, the missiles were not.
For several years, controversy had reigned within intelligence and military circles about what threat Soviet ABMs posed to American ballistic missiles. The driving force for this higher resolution was apparently (the evidence is weak) the Soviet Union’s burgeoning anti-ballistic missile program. The major unknown is what was behind the VHR requirement-why did the satellite have to be so powerful? What were they looking for? The Very High Resolution satellite then being discussed in 1968 was intended to have resolution better or equal to DORIAN, and its existence while MOL/DORIAN was still ongoing indicates that those advocating for it did not believe that MOL would fulfill the requirement. The goal for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory and its big DORIAN optical system was around six inches (15 centimeters) resolution on the ground, possibly up to four inches (10 centimeters) if viewing conditions were ideal. The GAMBIT-3 (also referred to as the KH-8) entered service in 1966 and its resolution was apparently initially around two feet (61 centimeters), improving to 12 inches (30 centimeters) relatively quickly. The CORONA search satellite had at best six-foot (1.8-meter) resolution and was scheduled to be replaced by 1970 or 1971 by the HEXAGON, with resolution of 1–3 feet (61–91 centimeters). Part of the difficulty of discerning VHR’s origins is that the capabilities of some of the NRO’s reconnaissance satellites at that time remain classified. Declassified documents do not yet indicate why some members of the intelligence community believed that a significantly higher resolution satellite was required despite the already impressive planned performance of the MOL/DORIAN, but the Cuban Missile Crisis was certainly a good case study on the value of better photography. When and where it started is unclear, but it appears that the first discussion of VHR began in 1968.
Satellite eyes series#
It was never formally a “program,” but instead was at most a series of studies.
The VHR program is referenced in only a few declassified NRO documents and histories. VHR was supposed to take the kinds of photographs that the RF-8 Crusaders had taken six years earlier, but in areas of the world that no Crusader could fly. This program was known as the “Very High Resolution” or VHR reconnaissance satellite, and at least one iteration appears to have been referred to by some as HEXADOR, as a combination of HEXAGON and DORIAN hardware. So it is surprising that amidst all this work, some within the NRO began discussing developing yet another photographic reconnaissance satellite program, one which remains relatively obscure and little known even today, over five decades later. Both spacecraft were big-requiring powerful Titan III launch vehicles to put them in low Earth orbit-and both were also complicated, expensive, and over-budget.
Satellite eyes full#
(credit: US Navy()īy 1968, with both the HEXAGON and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL)/DORIAN reconnaissance satellites under development, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had its hands full working on the next-generation satellite reconnaissance systems. An RF-8 Crusader from the same reconnaissance squadron that flew dangerous missions over Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.
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